The Handbook of Tunnel Fire Safety

Published by Thomas Telford Publishing, Thomas Telford Ltd, 1 Heron Quay, London E14 4JD. www.thomastelford.com Distributors for Thomas Telford books are USA: ASCE Press, 1801 Alexander Bell Drive, Reston, VA 20191-4400 Japan: Maruzen Co. Ltd, Book Department, 3–10 Nihonbashi 2-chome, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 103 Australia: DA Books and Journals, 648 Whitehorse Road, Mitcham 3132, Victoria

Cover photo courtesy of Canton Wallis, Switzerland First published 2005 Throughout this book the personal pronouns ‘he’, ‘his’, etc. may be used when referring to engineers etc. for reasons of readability. These are to be regarded as grammatically neutral in gender, rather than masculine, in all cases.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 0 7277 3168 8 # Thomas Telford unless otherwise stated, 2005 Preface, Introduction, Chapters 1, 4, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18 # the author(s) Research Report 255. Evaluation of CFD to predict smoke movement in complex enclosed spaces. Health and Safety Executive (2002) # Crown copyright material is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and Queen’s Printer for Scotland All rights, including translation, reserved. Except as permitted by the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the Publishing Director, Thomas Telford Publishing, Thomas Telford Ltd, 1 Heron Quay, London E14 4JD, or the author(s) where copyright is stated otherwise. This book is published on the understanding that the authors are solely responsible for the statements made and opinions expressed in it and that its publication does not necessarily imply that such statements and/or opinions are or reﬂect the views or opinions of the publishers or editors. While every eﬀort has been made to ensure that the statements made and the opinions expressed in this publication provide a safe and accurate guide, no liability or responsibility can be accepted in this respect by the authors or publishers. Typeset by Academic þ Technical, Bristol Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books, Bodmin, Cornwall

Preface This is the ﬁrst ever Handbook of tunnel ﬁre safety. That it has appeared at this time is in part a reﬂection of the considerable growth in tunnel construction worldwide and in part a reﬂection of concern in society about tunnel safety and ﬁre safety in particular. While much research has been carried out on tunnel ﬁre safety over the years, a text bringing together basic knowledge over a broad spectrum has not existed. This Handbook makes a ﬁrst eﬀort at ﬁlling this gap. It is intended for all those involved in tunnel ﬁre safety, from ﬁre brigade personnel who are at the sharp end when a tunnel ﬁre occurs, to tunnel designers and operators as well as researchers. While the diﬀerent chapters address diﬀerent aspects, it is intended that a central theme should run through the book; that is, the need to see ﬁre risk as a product of the working of a system. It follows from this that considerations of emergency planning and design against ﬁre need to be in at the beginning of the design stage; the philosophy of regarding ﬁre safety measures as a ‘bolt on’ after a design has largely been completed is now totally unacceptable, especially in light of the ever longer and more complex tunnels that are now being built or planned. Within this context, this text hopes to be a bridge between tunnel ﬁre research and those who need to know basic results, techniques and current thinking in decision-making with respect to tunnel ﬁre safety. Beyond that, it is also a vehicle for the transmission of contemporary thinking in the subject. The Handbook covers a broad span of knowledge and, consistent with this, authorities in the various ﬁelds have written the diﬀerent chapters. The chapter titles and contents reﬂect the range of work which has been conducted in the past. Much research remains to be done, however. For example, currently we know very little about human behaviour in tunnel ﬁres. Also, preventing ﬁres occurring in tunnels as opposed to trying to protect after ﬁre exists needs much more consideration. Further, the general move towards a performance-based decision-making philosophy implies probabilistic concepts; much more needs to be done here. This also relates to the question of what is to be regarded as ‘acceptable risk’ in relation to tunnel ﬁres. Much consideration and debate needs to take place in this area, including all those involved and aﬀected. This ﬁrst Handbook is intended to represent the broad sweep of knowledge at the present time; the chapter authors are international experts in their own ﬁelds. The time is ripe for such a volume and it is hoped that it will become a valuable resource for all those concerned with tunnel ﬁre safety. Alan Beard Richard Carvel Edinburgh, April 2004

Biographies ALAN BEARD, Reader in Fire Safety Engineering, Civil Engineering Section, School of the Built Environment, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, UK. Alan Beard studied Physics at Leicester University and in 1972 was awarded a PhD in Theoretical Physics from Durham University. He is a Chartered Mathematician and Member of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications as well as of the Institution of Fire Engineers. After carrying out research in medical physics at Exeter University and the University of Wales, in 1977 he started ﬁre research at Edinburgh University, leaving in 1995 to go to Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, where he has been Reader in Fire Safety Engineering since 2003. His research is in the very broad area of modelling in relation to ﬁre safety; including deterministic and probabilistic modelling as well as qualitative research, in particular applying the concepts of systems to safety management. His research has covered ﬁre safety in buildings, oﬀshore installations and railways. Since 1993, a major research interest has been in the ﬁeld of tunnel ﬁres. He has conducted research for both government departments and industrial companies. Further, his papers have been used as key references by the International Standards Organization and some of his research has been translated into Japanese. More generally, he is concerned to help to develop a framework for the acceptable use of ﬁre models in ﬁre safety decision-making. ARTHUR G. BENDELIUS, Associated Consultant, Parsons Brinckerhoﬀ, Quade & Douglas, USA. Arthur Bendelius served as Senior Vice President, Principal Professional Associate and Technical Director for Tunnel Ventilation with Parsons Brinckerhoﬀ. He currently serves as Parsons Brinckerhoﬀ’s Technical Director for Tunnel Ventilation. His technical background is in mechanical systems, particularly tunnel services such as ventilation, ﬁre protection and drainage systems. He currently serves as the most recent Chair of the NFPA Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection Technical Committee (which is responsible for ‘NFPA 502 Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges and Other Limited Access Highways’) and is a Member of the NFPA Fixed Guideway Transit Systems Technical Committee (responsible for ‘NFPA 130 Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems’). He currently is a Member of the World Road Association (PIARC) – Technical Committee C-5 3.3 ‘Road Tunnel Operation’ and serves as Animateur of PIARC Working Group No 6 on Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels. He also continues to serve as a Member of ASHRAE Technical Committee TC 5.9 ‘Enclosed Vehicular Facilities’. He has authored over 30 technical papers and professional articles and is one of the contributing authors to the Tunnel Engineering Handbook, the ASHRAE Handbook on Applications and the Fire Protection Handbook. He has a BE degree and a MMS degree from Stevens Institute of Technology. He is a Fellow of the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers and the Society of American Military Engineers. He is also a Member of the British Tunneling Society. He is a Registered Professional Engineer. ANDERS BERGQVIST, Senior Division Oﬃcer and Fire Safety Engineer, Stockholm Fire Brigade, Sweden. Anders Bergqvist has been a Senior Division Oﬃcer and Fire Safety Engineer in Stockholm Fire Brigade since 1997. During 2001–2002 he worked as Head of Section at SP Swedish National Testing and Research Institute. Before he started working in Stockholm, he worked as a teacher for the National Rescue Service Agency, with ﬁre safety for the Swedish Navy and as a ﬁre ﬁghter for

Prince Georges Fire Department (USA). He is a Fire Safety Engineer from the University of Lund and is a Member of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers, Swedish chapter. He works both with the operational ﬁre and rescue service and with ﬁre prevention, and during the last seven years he has worked with ﬁre prevention and contingency planning for ﬁre and rescue operations in tunnels. DAVID BURNS, Assistant Chief Fire Oﬃcer, Merseyside Fire Service, UK. David Burns is an Assistant Chief Fire Oﬃcer with Merseyside Fire Service in the UK and has served in several metropolitan ﬁre services in the UK. He has been a professional ﬁreﬁghter for 26 years. He is a Member of the European Fire Services Tunnels Group and has presented papers on the subject of tunnel ﬁre safety and emergency management at national and international conferences. CLAUDE CALISTI, Chief of the Fires and Explosives Department of the Laboratoire Central of the Prefecture de Police de Paris, France. Claude Calisti obtained a Licence es Sciences, option Chemistry (old regime) in 1961 at the University of Marseille-Provence, France. From 1962 to 1965, he was Moniteur and then Delegate Assistant in General Chemistry (Professor Edouard Calvet). In 1965, he became an Engineer in the Service of Explosives at the Laboratoire Central of the Prefecture de Police de Paris (LCPP); he participated at de-mining operations and technical enquiries after ﬁres, explosions and attacks perpetrated with explosives. In 1976, he was promoted to Chief Engineer in the Service of Explosives of the LCPP and in 1999 he became the Chief of the ﬁres and explosives department of the LCPP. Since 2002, he has acted as Scientiﬁc Counsellor for Madame la Pre´fe`te, General Secretary of the ‘defense’ zone of Paris. He has been an Expert for the Court of Appeal of Paris since 1973, recognised by the Cassation Court since 1981 (specialities: explosives, explosions and ﬁres). He has been a Member of many national commissions (de-mining, explosives, AFNOR) and of work groups at the Ministe`re de l’Inte´rieur and Ministe`re de l’Aviation civile and has participated in several international seminars and meetings. RICHARD CARVEL, Research Associate in Fire Safety Engineering, University of Edinburgh, UK. During his time as a Research Associate at Heriot-Watt University (1998 to 2004) Richard Carvel studied tunnel ﬁre phenomena and was awarded a PhD for his thesis Fire Size in Tunnels in 2004. He has established an international reputation in the ﬁeld of tunnel ﬁre safety through numerous presentations at international tunnel safety and ﬁre symposia. Before his studies on tunnel ﬁres, he spent four years studying dust detonations at the Centre for Explosion Studies, University of Aberystwyth. He is a graduate of St Andrews University, obtaining a BSc (Hons) in Chemistry and Physics in 1992 and an MPhil in Chemistry in 1994. He has also worked as a Consultant with International Fire Investigators and Consultants (IFIC), Glasgow. PHILIPPE CASSINI, Technical Co-ordinator, Institut National de l’Environnement Industriel et des Risques (INERIS), France. Philippe Cassini graduated as an Engineer from the Ecole Centrale de Lyon in 1975. After graduation, he worked for six years for the French underground coal mines. Then he started to work at the Centre d’Etudes et Recherche des CHARbonnages de France (CERCHAR), where he studied the ambient conditions in deep mines. In 1991, he took the position of Manager of the industrial ventilation laboratory. He has been involved in many projects concerning ﬁre safety in tunnel and underground network ventilation. He also studied the safety issues of some major tunnel projects (Gotthard, Lotschberg). In 1994 he developed a ﬁrst version of a new tool for the Quantitative Risk Assessment of the road transportation of dangerous goods. In 1997–1999, he was the leader of a consortium which delivered a second completed version (OCDE/PIARC project ERS2). In 2000 he became Team Manager for major risk evaluations in the Accidental Risk Division (DRA). He has been an Expert Member of the French National Comity for Safety in Road Tunnels which was created after the Mont Blanc catastrophe. He is presently Technical Co-ordinator for the public funded actions of INERIS.

DAVID CHARTERS, Director and Group Leader, Arup Fire, Leeds, UK. David Charters is a chartered Fire Engineer with a doctorate in ﬁre growth and smoke movement in tunnels. He is Visiting Professor at the University of Ulster (FireSERT), Chair of British Standards Committee FSH/24 Fire Safety Engineering, and International President Elect of the Institution of Fire Engineers. Recent experience includes new and existing tunnels for MTRC and Network Rail, Channel Tunnel Rail Link, Dublin Port Tunnel and New Tyne Crossing. In addition, he was heavily involved in the rail industry ﬁre safety and risk assessment after the King’s Cross ﬁre disaster in 1987. OLIVIER DELE´MONT, Senior Lecturer at the Institut de Police Scientiﬁque et de Criminologie of the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. Olivier Dele´mont graduated in forensic sciences at the Institut de Police Scientiﬁque et de Criminologie (IPSC) of the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, in 1996. Since then, he has worked at this institute as Scientiﬁc Collaborator, performing simultaneously research, educational and judicial expert assessment activities. Since 2003, he has also worked part-time in the technical and scientiﬁc service of the Geneva state police as a Criminologist. In 2004, he was promoted to Senior Lecturer at the Institut de Police Scientiﬁque and completed his PhD in research concerned with ﬁre investigation and ﬁre modelling. At present he is continuing his work in the technical and scientiﬁc service of the police and in the Institut de Police Scientiﬁque of the University of Lausanne. ARNOLD DIX, Adjunct Professor of Engineering at Queensland University of Technology, Australia. Arnold Dix is formally qualiﬁed as both a scientist and a lawyer. He was appointed Adjunct Professor of Engineering at Queensland University of Technology in early 2004. He is Australia’s delegate for PIARC (a United Nations aﬃliate inter-governmental organisation) on the ﬁre and life safety in tunnels working group. He also Heads the International Tunnelling Association’s Contractual Practices group and is Secretary to their security group. He advises both governments and corporations on the management of underground transport infrastructure risks and is actively involved in projects around the world. MICHEL EGGER, Secretary General of the Conference of European Directors of Roads, France. Michel Egger graduated as a Civil Engineer in 1972 from the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. He then worked for construction companies managing a wide range of projects in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. From 1999 to 2004 he was Deputy Director and Chief of the Road Infrastructure Division of the Federal Road Authorities, Bern, Switzerland where he was responsible for the construction, maintenance and operation of the Swiss national road network. He was a Federal Delegate during the reconstruction of the Gotthard Tunnel after the ﬁre of 2001 and President of the international group of experts on safety in tunnels for the United Nations Economic Council for Europe (UN-ECE) in Geneva. From 2004 he has been Secretary General of the Conference of European Directors of Roads (CEDR), Paris, France. CEDR comprises 25 European directors who deal with all aspects of roads and road transport. He is President of the Strategic Plan ad hoc Group deﬁning the priorities for the actions of CEDR. HA˚KAN FRANTZICH, Senior Lecturer, Department of Fire Safety Engineering, Lund University, Sweden. Ha˚kan Frantzich has a degree in Fire Protection Engineering from the Department of Fire Safety Engineering, Lund University, and a PhD in Fire Safety Engineering Risk Analysis. After the PhD he continued working for the Department as a Researcher and is at present a Senior Lecturer. He has mainly been working in the area of safety during evacuation. Reports which he has produced cover both human behaviour and movement of people during ﬁre and evacuation. He took a licentiate degree in 1994 in this area. During the past few years he has been more involved in projects where the

risk to people is evaluated. His recent research covers aspects such as dominant factors contributing to successful evacuation and risk index methods for health care facilities. He is also involved in developing rational veriﬁcation procedures for Fire Safety Engineering design. JOHN GILLARD, General Manager, Mersey Tunnels, UK. John Gillard holds an honours degree in Civil Engineering, is a Chartered Engineer and a Member of the Institution of Civil Engineers. After graduation, he spent two and a half years in academic research in the ﬁeld of ﬂuid dynamics. He then moved into the construction industry and spent ten years designing and building a wide range of works, including stormwater drainage, motorways, urban infrastructure, industrial and petrochemical complexes and airports in the UK and throughout Africa. He moved into the ﬁeld of engineering operation and maintenance in 1982, initially airports and subsequently road tunnels. He has worked for Mersey Tunnels for 19 years, 14 of which have been as General Manager. He has been a Member of the Technical Advisory Committee for a number of international conferences series since 1991 and has written several papers on Tunnels Safety and Tunnels Management and Operation. GEORGE GRANT, Safety Engineering Group, Halcrow Group Ltd, Stockton-on-Tees, UK. George Grant has 20 years’ research and commercial experience in various aspects of ﬁre safety engineering. After graduating in Civil Engineering at Dundee University, his PhD research concerned the problem of ﬁres in railway tunnels. Joining Mott MacDonald in 1987, he worked on the design of the ventilation systems for the Channel Tunnel before embarking on a seven-year post-doctoral tenure at the University of Edinburgh’s Unit of Fire Safety Engineering. In 1998, he established his own consultancy business and worked with Eurotunnel on the development of the Onboard Fire Suppression System Project for HGV shuttle trains. He joined Halcrow Group in 2004 and continues to work on challenging projects within the newly-formed ﬁre safety engineering group. KJELL HASSELROT, BBm Fireconsulting, Bromma, Sweden. Kjell Hasselrot worked as a ﬁre ﬁghter for Stockholm Fire Brigade for 25 years. He has also been involved in the training of ﬁre ﬁghters. He started his own company, BBm Fireconsulting, Bromma, in 1998. HAUKUR INGASON, SP Swedish National Testing and Research Institute, Bora˚s, Sweden. Haukur Ingason has over ten years’ international experience in ﬁre research. He has worked and studied in the USA, Europe and Scandinavia and obtained a PhD degree at the Technical University in Lund, Sweden. He has published over 30 scientiﬁc papers and reports on diﬀerent subjects concerning ﬁre safety. His present working place, the Swedish National Testing and Research Institute (SP), is one of a very few institutes in the world with recognised expertise in the subject area of ﬁre safety. In 1994 he was the Chairman of the First International Conference on Fire Safety in Tunnels held at SP. He has been involved in large-scale and model-scale studies of ﬁre and smoke spread in tunnels and a number of advanced consulting projects on tunnel ﬁre safety. His main contributions to the ﬁre safety community of tunnel safety are in the areas of design ﬁres, smoke movement, visibility in smoke and the inﬂuence of ventilation on ﬁre development. STUART JAGGER, Head of the Health and Safety Laboratory, Buxton, UK. Stuart Jagger studied Physics at Imperial College, London before going on to complete a PhD in Space Physics. After periods at Leeds and Reading Universities conducting post-doctoral research on satellite remote sensing, he joined the Atomic Energy Authority’s Safety and Reliability Directorate where he worked to develop models for the dispersion of dense gas clouds and source terms of releases of hazardous gases and liquids on chemical plant. In 1987 he joined the Health & Safety Executive’s Research and Laboratory Services Division (now the Health & Safety Laboratory – HSL) to work in the Fire Safety Section of which he is now Head. During his time at HSL he has

been involved in the study of hazards from a number of industrial ﬁre situations including chemical warehousing, tunnels, oﬀshore and nuclear facilities. He has also been involved in and directed several large incident investigations including those at Ladbroke Grove, in the Channel Tunnel, Grangemouth and King’s Cross Underground Station. For his work on the latter he was jointly awarded the ImechE’s Julius Groen Prize with his colleague Keith Moodie. HERMANN KNOFLACHER, Chair in Transport Planning and Traﬃc Engineering, Technical University of Vienna, Austria. Hermann Knoﬂacher has a Civil Engineering degree from the University of Vienna (1963), a Natural Science degree also from the University of Vienna (1965) and a PhD in Transportation Engineering. He left the University in 1968 and established the Institute of Transport Science, in the Austrian Transport Safety Board. He was Head of this Institute until 1985 and was responsible for several books and studies on transportation planning, traﬃc safety and human behaviour. Since 1972 he has been a Lecturer at the University of Technology in Vienna for traﬃc engineering. In 1971 he established a consulting company, which carried out most of the transport plans for Austrian cities, Austrian states, and national and international bodies, and more than 200 research projects. He has been engaged in tunnel safety since 1971 and was Advisor to the Minister for over eight years during the seventies and eighties. In 2001 he was asked to Chair the commission to enhance the traﬃc safety of Austrian tunnels. He is a Member of several national and international science and engineering organisations and the author of over 500 publications on transport planning, traﬃc safety and transport policy. SANDRO MACIOCIA, Formerly Project Engineer, Area Sales Manager and Export Sales Manager, Securiton AG, Switzerland. Sandro Maciocia holds an Electrical Engineer Diploma in Industrial Electronics and Technology of Energy, obtained at the Engineering School of Basle in Muttenz, Switzerland in1990. He worked for two years as a Project Engineer on the electrical equipment of rolling stock and for nine years was a Project Engineer, Area Sales Manager and Export Sales Manager for Securiton AG in the ﬁeld of alarm systems applications. He specialises in ﬁre alarm system engineering in tunnel applications; he has both theoretical and practical experience in design, installation, testing and assessment of ﬁre alarm systems. GUY MARLAIR, Institut National de l’Environnement Industriel et des Risques (INERIS), France. Guy Marlair was born in Brussels in 1957 and received his major education in France, completed by a diploma in Engineering. He started his professional career in the ﬁeld of Fluidised Bed Combustion. He has been working for the past 14 years as a ﬁre expert at INERIS. He has achieved considerable experience in a variety of technical domains associated with ﬁre safety at an international level, including the use and development of ﬁre testing, ﬁre toxicity issues, ﬁre hazard assessment in warehouses and tunnels, and experimental studies of chemical ﬁres. He has very recently taken part in two EC funded projects related to tunnel ﬁres safety, named FIT and UPTUN, and was also involved in the EUREKA 499 project on a related topic. He has authored or co-authored some 40 papers in journals, conferences and books on ﬁre safety. He is also active in several standardisation committees (ISO TC92 SC3 and SC4, CEN TC114 WG 16, Chair of AFNOR X65A), and is a Member of the IAFSS. He is a Lecturer in several training centres and is currently working as a Program Leader on ‘Energetic Materials’ and related explosion and ﬁre safety issues. JEAN-CLAUDE MARTIN, Honorary Professor at the Institut de Police Scientiﬁque et de Criminologie of the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. Jean-Claude Martin graduated in Forensic Sciences and Criminology at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland in 1967. From there, he pursued in parallel the careers of Chemistry Teacher in a high school and Criminalist in the forensic service of the police. In 1991, he obtained a PhD in Forensic

Sciences, in the subject of ﬁre investigation, at the Institut de Police Scientiﬁque et de Criminologie (IPSC) of the University of Lausanne and became Scientiﬁc Collaborator in this institute. Since then he has led a research group in ﬁre investigation and conducted many judicial expert assessments in the IPSC. In 1994, he was promoted to Associate Professor at the IPSC before becoming Honorary Professor at the same institution in 2002. JOHN OLESEN, Chief Fire Oﬃcer, Korso¨r Fire Brigade, Denmark. John Olesen has been involved in tunnel safety for more than a decade and is responsible for the exercises that are carried out every year in the tunnels with up to 1000 participants. He has been involved in the making and implementing of plans, communication strategy, cost-beneﬁt systems etc. in tunnels. He has been educated as an Oﬃcer in the air force, the national and the municipal emergency services and is a frequent speaker at international conferences and also a member of international tunnel groups. NORMAN RHODES, Project Manager, Hatch Mott MacDonald, USA. Norman Rhodes is one of the world’s leading experts in the application of advanced engineering analysis to solve complex design problems. He has extensive knowledge and experience of the application of simulation techniques for engineering design and is an international expert in the use of computational ﬂuid dynamics, having applied these techniques extensively in the design of normal and emergency ventilation systems, analysis of the aerodynamics of trains in tunnels and the prediction of smoke movement and ﬁres in tunnels and buildings. His experience extends from the development and application of the very ﬁrst general-purpose Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) models for three-dimensional ventilation and ﬁre analysis to their present-day application in design. He is the Secretary of the PIARC Working Group on Fire and Smoke Control in Tunnels, and is a co-author of their publication Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels. He also serves on the steering committee of the European Community Fires in Tunnels Thematic Network and is responsible for the preparation of best practice guidelines for emergency response management. EMMANUEL RUFFIN, Program Manager, Institut National de l’Environnement Industriel et des Risques (INERIS), France. Emmanuel Ruﬃn’s academic career comprises Fluid Mechanics and Aeronautics Engineering studies at the University of Marseilles (1990) and a PhD in 1994 also in Marseilles (thesis on Study of variable density turbulent jets using second order models ðRANSÞÞ. From 1994 he was a Researcher at INERIS, involved in explosion, dispersion and ﬁre thematics in the open air as well as in conﬁned spaces. In those various ﬁelds he at ﬁrst played a major part in experimental studies. Some of these applications were devoted to the design and measurement of safety ventilation equipment for underground nuclear waste sites and process industries. In parallel he produced a new model for the evaluation of explosion pressure waves, named EXPLOJET which can be used to complement the Multi-Energy and TNT methods for ﬂammable jet clouds. Since 1996 he has been involved in tunnel safety. In that domain he has developed a new model for the evaluation of accidental risks in underground networks, named NewVendis which is today a key model of the research work program of the on-going UPTUN project within the 5th framework programme. He has led the ventilation measurement campaign during the legal on-site enquiry of the Mont Blanc tunnel catastrophe and has participated in the ﬁre scenario reconstitution. He recently participated in the review of the Global Safety Case of the Channel Tunnel as safety expert of the French delegation. Since 2001 he has been the Program Manager for ‘Tunnels Safety and Transportation of Dangerous Goods’. In the ﬁeld of Dangerous Goods (DGs) he has followed up the work initiated by INERIS for the road transport of DGs (development of the OECD/PIARC QRAM) by managing new developments in order to realise Comparative and Quantiﬁed Risk Assessment for Rail, Road and Multimodal transport of DGs. In that domain he is also involved in safety issues related to the nodal infrastructure of the transport chain. He is a Member of the Working Groups of the Committee for the Safety Assessment of

Road Tunnels. In that WG he contributes to the evolution of regulation and to the production of guidance for its application. JAIME SANTOS-REYES, Research Associate, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, UK. Jaime Santos-Reyes’ main research interest is safety management systems. He obtained a PhD from Heriot-Watt in 2001 for his thesis The Development of a Fire Safety Management System (FSMS). Since then he has used the systemic safety management system model that he developed to look at safety management on oﬀshore installations, on the UK railway network and in tunnels. He is currently using the model to analyse a number of accidents that have occurred in other industries. He has a degree in Mechanical Engineering from the Instituto Politecnico Nacional, Mexico and an MSc in Thermal Power and Fluid Engineering from UMIST, UK. He has also spent some years working in the oil and gas industry. JIM SHIELDS, FireSERT Centre, University of Ulster, UK. Jim Shields is a founding member of the Fire Safety Engineering Research and Technology Centre (FireSERT) at the University of Ulster. He was the Director of FireSERT since its establishment until January 2004. He has over 100 journal publications as well as several books. He serves on many national and international committees and was a Member of the Fire Authority for Northern Ireland and was Chair of the Authority’s Safety Committee. He serves on the Northern Ireland Buildings Regulations Committee (NIBRAC) which advises the Department of Environment Finance and Personnel Oﬃce Estates and Building Standards Division on Building Regulation matters. He is a UK delegate to ISO TC92/SC4 and was liaison between ISO TC92/SC4 and CIB W14 Fire. He led UoE33 Built Environment through the 1992, 1996 and 2002 Research Assessment Exercise to great success. He is the founder and co-ordinator of the Fire Safety Engineering Networks (FERN) and Human Behaviour in Fire (HUBFIN) in the UK. He has served on the Council of the University. His contribution to Fire Safety Engineering was recognised by the Association of Building Engineers in 1995 when he was their recipient of the prestigious Fire Safety Award. MARTIN SHIPP, Associate Director, FRS, and Head of FRS Centre for Fire Safety in Transport, Building Research Establishment, UK. Martin Shipp joined FRS in 1974. He is responsible for ﬁre investigation, ﬁre safety management and projects related to all aspects of transport ﬁre safety. Since 1988 he has headed the FRS team carrying out ﬁre investigations, including Piper Alpha (1988), and Windsor Castle (1992). He is a Member of the Management Committee of the UK Forum of Arson Investigators and is a Guest Member of the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes Fire and Explosion Investigation Working Group. He was a Member of the Safety Authority investigation into the Channel Tunnel ﬁre in 1996 and the Railtrack investigation into the Paddington Railway Fire in 1999. He assisted Bedfordshire Police with the investigation into the Yarl’s Wood Detention Centre Fire (2002).

Contents Preface, Alan Beard and Richard Carvel Biographies Introduction: tunnel ﬁre safety decision-making and knowledge, Alan Beard Part I. 1.

Real tunnel ﬁres

A history of ﬁre incidents in tunnels Richard Carvel and Guy Marlair

iii iv xvii 1 3

Introduction Fires in road tunnels Fires in rail tunnels Concluding comments A history of tunnel ﬁre incidents Acknowledgements References

3 4 6 8 9 37 37

Tunnel ﬁre investigation I: The Channel Tunnel ﬁre, 18 November 1996 Martin Shipp

Introduction The Channel Tunnel ﬁre The tunnel system The ﬁre safety system The incident The investigation Method Findings from the incident Issues, problems and lessons for ﬁre investigation Discussion Conclusions Acknowledgements Abbreviations Appendix 2.1. Background of the CTSA References

42 42 42 43 44 44 46 48 49 50 51 51 51 51 52

Tunnel ﬁre investigation II: The St Gotthard Tunnel ﬁre, 24 October 2001 Jean-Claude Martin, Olivier Dele´mont and Claude Calisti. Translated by R. Carvel

Introduction Incident summary Aims of the investigation into the ﬁre and explosion Summary description of the incident zone Chronology of the incident Discussion of the chronology The origin of the ﬁre

53 53 55 55 60 60 60

Cause of ﬁre Propagation of the ﬁre across HGVs 1 and 2 Spread of the ﬁre to HGVs 3 to 7 Thermal degradation on the vehicles beyond HGV 7 General discussion Conclusions Appendix 3.1. Important factors relating to the investigation of a ﬁre in a road tunnel Part II. 4.

Prevention and protection

64 71 72 73 74 74 75 77

Prevention and protection: general concepts Alan Beard

Introduction Risk as a systemic product Hazard and risk Prevention and protection as basic concepts Context and causation Prevention and protection in tunnels Fire safety management Fire prevention Fire protection Summary Appendix 4.1. Thoughts on avoiding major tunnel ﬁres (Paul Scott) References

79 79 81 82 83 83 86 87 87 88 89 92

Fire detection systems Sandro Maciocia

Introduction Problems of detecting ﬁres Performance requirements for ﬁre detection systems Diﬀerent approaches to alerting tunnel users Currently available line-type heat ﬁre detectors Assessing state-of-the-art ﬁre alarm systems Future trends and emerging new technologies Conclusions References

93 93 98 100 101 103 105 108 109

Fire protection in concrete tunnels Richard Carvel

Introduction Types of tunnels The behaviour of concrete subject to ﬁre Passive ﬁre protection Active ﬁre protection A proposed alternative ﬁre suppression system Concluding comment References

110 111 111 113 119 122 123 124

Tunnel ventilation – state of the art Art Bendelius

Introduction Types of ventilation system

Ventilation system components Facilities Technology The future References Additional reading

134 137 137 140 140 143

Use of tunnel ventilation for ﬁre safety Stuart Jagger and George Grant

Introduction Modes of operation of tunnel ventilation systems during a ﬁre Inﬂuence of ventilation on tunnel ﬁre characteristics Modelling tunnel ﬂows Conclusions References

144 146 157 165 176 178

The inﬂuence of tunnel ventilation on ﬁre behaviour Richard Carvel and Alan Beard

Introduction Basic ﬁre science Deﬁnitions Methodology A note on naturally ventilated tunnel ﬁres Results Discussion Conclusions Acknowledgements References

184 184 186 187 188 189 195 196 197 197

Part III. Tunnel ﬁre dynamics

A history of experimental tunnel ﬁres Richard Carvel and Guy Marlair

Introduction Fire experiments to gain understanding of ﬁre phenomena Fire experiments to evaluate sprinkler performance Fire experiments to test or commission tunnel installations Fire tests in operational tunnels Experimental testing on a smaller scale Laboratory-scale experiments Non-tunnel ﬁre experiments Concluding comment Further information References

201 201 212 213 215 218 221 224 226 227 227

Fire dynamics in tunnels Haukur Ingason

Introduction Tunnel ﬁres and open ﬁres Tunnel ﬁres and compartment ﬁres Fuel control and ventilation control

231 231 232 237

Stratiﬁcation of smoke in tunnels Average ﬂow conditions in longitudinal ﬂow Determination of HRRs in tunnel ﬁres Flame length Large ﬁres in tunnels with longitudinal ﬂow Fire spread in tunnels Nomenclature References

241 245 252 254 258 259 262 263

CFD modelling of tunnel ﬁres Norman Rhodes

Introduction Mathematical overview Physical phenomena in tunnel ﬁre situations Application of CFD techniques to tunnel ﬁres Validation and veriﬁcation Case study: The Memorial Tunnel experiments Concluding remarks Notation References

267 268 271 271 274 275 282 282 282

Control volume modelling of tunnel ﬁres David Charters

Introduction Application of control volumes to tunnel ﬁres Application of control volume models to tunnel ﬁre safety Summary References

284 284 290 297 297

Problems with using models for ﬁre safety Alan Beard

Introduction Models and the real world Kinds of theoretical models Models as part of tunnel ﬁre safety decision making Illustrative case The potential of a speciﬁc model in tunnel ﬁre safety decision making An acceptable ‘methodology of use’ A ‘knowledgeable user’ Evacuation modelling Conclusions References

299 300 303 306 308 313 313 314 315 315 317

Part IV. Fire safety management and human factors

Human behaviour in tunnel ﬁres Jim Shields

Introduction Some recent tunnel ﬁres Towards understanding human behaviour in tunnel ﬁres Responding to a developing emergency

323 323 329 338

Recent developments Concluding remarks References

Recommended behaviour for road tunnel users Michel Egger

Introduction Safety and risks in road traﬃc Safety objectives in road tunnels Road users as a factor inﬂuencing safety in road tunnels Proposed measures for road users Conclusions and outlook References

343 344 345 347 349 353 353

Transport of hazardous goods Emmanuel Ruﬃn, Philippe Cassini and Hermann Knoﬂacher

Introduction Section I: Road tunnels The situation concerning the road transport of hazardous goods in the European Union Harmonised groupings of dangerous goods Quantitative risk assessment model Risk reduction measures for road tunnels Member states’ experiences of the QRAM Section II: Rail transport and road/rail intermodality The situation concerning the rail transport of hazardous goods in the EU The situation in the professional engineering world for rail transport A new QRA model for rail Conclusions References

354 354 354 355 366 374 376 381 381 382 383 385 386

A systemic approach to tunnel ﬁre safety management Jaime Santos-Reyes and Alan Beard

Introduction A Tunnel Fire Safety Management System model Fire safety performance The MRA, the acceptable range of ﬁre risk and the viability Conclusion Appendix 18.1. The four organisational principles Appendix 18.2. Control and communication paradigms References

388 389 399 403 403 404 405 406

Road tunnel operation during a ﬁre emergency John Gillard

General introduction The stakeholders in tunnel safety The factors that inﬂuence tunnel operational safety The nature of incidents Liaison between tunnel operator and emergency services Incident response Decisions and actions

408 409 410 412 414 416 417

Tunnel ﬁre safety and the law Arnold Dix

Introduction Legal investigations follow incidents Legal investigations scrutinise past decisions Conclusions References

422 422 428 433 433

Part V. Emergency procedures

Emergency procedures in road tunnels: current practice and future ideas David Burns

Introduction Managing safety in tunnels Contingency planning Equipment provision Location of emergency response teams Rapid response teams Incident management Integration of design and management with emergency response Conclusions References

437 437 441 445 445 446 446 447 449 450

Emergency procedures in rail tunnels: current practice and future ideas John Olesen

Introduction Standard operational procedures? Contingency planning Considerations Education, training Conclusions A detailed example: emergency procedures in the Great Belt Tunnel, Denmark

451 451 457 465 468 473 473

Fire and rescue operations in tunnel ﬁres: a discussion of some practical issues Anders Bergqvist, Ha˚kan Frantzich, Kjell Hasselrot and Haukur Ingason

Introduction Reference assumptions An accident has occurred and rescue work is in progress Breathing apparatus operations in complicated environments Extinguishing extensive ﬁres in tunnels The rescue work continues What are the main problems in dealing with a ﬁre and rescue situation in a tunnel and how can they be solved? Conclusions References

481 481 482 484 486 487

Introduction: tunnel ﬁre safety decision-making and knowledge Alan Beard, Heriot-Watt University, UK

The general shift away from prescriptive to performance-based decision-making with regard to tunnel ﬁre safety is a double-edged sword. In some ways it is a very desirable shift but in other ways it may backﬁre. Whatever else it implies, it means that there is a need to assess the risk in some way and this is good. Prescriptive regulations, including ‘best practice’ codes and guides, have played a vital role in society, and should continue to do so. The key objective of tunnel ﬁre safety decision-making may be seen as to maintain risks within acceptable ranges. This would be with respect to: (1) fatality and injury, (2) property loss and (3) disruption of operation. However, with a purely prescriptive approach tunnel designers, operators and users are eﬀectively unaware of what the risks are with regard to the three categories above. Historical statistics give us some idea of the risk implicit in a particular system; however, there is a crucial problem with simply looking at statistics and that is this: the system changes over time. Simply considering historical statistics with regard to a particular tunnel over a long period, say 20 years, may be very misleading because it is certain that the system as it exists at one point will be diﬀerent to the system which exists 20 years later – or even ﬁve or ten years later. To consider just one factor alone, increasing traﬃc volume probably means that the systems associated with most road tunnels have changed dramatically in recent years. While a prescriptive approach would not recognise this (at least explicitly), it would be recognised in a ‘risk-based’ approach; or at least it should be. That is, a risk-based approach has the potential to be very valuable in helping us cope with decision-making in an increasingly complex and ever-changing world. However, the prescriptive approach should continue to be very valuable into the indeﬁnite future, since it represents a great fund of knowledge and experience gained over many years. Prescriptive features have a very important part to play along with a risk-based approach. The question is not so much ‘how can a risk-based approach replace a prescriptive approach?’ so much as ‘how can prescriptive elements play a valuable role as part of a risk-based approach?’ Both prescriptive and risk-based

approaches have their positive and negative aspects: while prescriptive codes do not allow us to understand the risk explicitly, they often represent a rich seam of knowledge and experience grounded in the real world. Conversely, while a risk-based approach does, in principle, allow us to appreciate what the risk is, there are considerable problems associated with assessing risk and being able to use that modelling as part of tunnel ﬁre safety decision-making in an eﬀective and acceptable way. The issue relates to knowing what methodology to adopt when applying a risk-based approach. Methodologies range from a very ‘hard’ methodology, in which there is overwhelming agreement among the ‘actors’ or ‘participants’ as to what the problem is and what is desirable, through to ‘soft systems’ methodologies. In a purely ‘hard’ methodology there is considerable knowledge and understanding of the system, very little uncertainty and no iteration in the decision-making process. The method proceeds from ‘problem’ to ‘solution’ in a mechanical orderly manner; see, for example, Reference 1. While such an approach may be suitable for some situations, e.g. putting in a simple telephone system, it is not suitable for tunnel ﬁre safety. At the other end of the spectrum are the ‘soft systems’ methodologies, for example the one by Checkland.2 The essential features of a soft systems approach are the existence of diﬀerent points of view among the people involved and aﬀected and lack of reliable knowledge about the system. There will usually be considerable uncertainty and may be diﬀerences of opinion as to what the ‘problem’ actually is. Classic soft systems problems are those associated with, say, healthcare. Between the hard and soft ends of the spectrum of methodologies are the intermediate methodologies. It is likely that an intermediate methodology would be appropriate for decision-making with respect to tunnel ﬁre safety. A methodology which is intermediate but lies towards the hard end of the spectrum is the one outlined by Charters3 in Figure 0.1. While this contains an iteration loop (one characteristic of an intermediate methodology), the degree to which it is hard or not depends upon how much time and eﬀort is put into each of the stages, for example the stage aimed at deciding whether or not the risk implicit in an option is acceptable. Another intermediate methodology is that constructed by the current author,4;5 an amended version of which is shown in Figure 0.2. This spends much more time in the earlier stages and includes an iteration loop after every stage. There is also an emphasis on learning from ‘near misses’. Near misses represent a very great source of information and knowledge about the behaviour of real-world systems and we should tap this source much more than we do at the present time. While this methodology is intermediate it leans more towards the softer end of the spectrum than does the methodology described by Charters. Having decided on an overall methodology, with a risk-based approach it becomes necessary to construct models in relation to tunnel ﬁres and the models constructed become ever more complex. There are fundamental problems associated with constructing and using models in a reliable and acceptable way. Every quantitative model makes conceptual assumptions and these may be inadequate. There may be, for example, possible real-world sequences which we simply do not know about and which, therefore, have not been considered in an analysis at all; this would be in addition to possibly unrealistic assumptions about sequences which have been included in an analysis. For example, a sequence involving a heavy goods vehicle (HGV) on ﬁre may be included in an analysis but the assumptions about ﬁre development and

Figure 0.1. Intermediate methodology A (Redrawn from Reference 3, with acknowledgements to Independent Technical Conferences and University of Dundee.)

spread may be unrealistic. Considerations of this kind have been discussed further in reference.6 In addition to possible uncertainty or ignorance about conceptual assumptions there is the problem of uncertainty about numerical assumptions. These diﬃculties mean that, even if a model has the potential to be valuable, acceptable use of a model is generally very problematic and requires a knowledgeable user employing an acceptable approach. As a general rule the conditions do not yet exist for reliable and acceptable use of complex computer-based models as part of tunnel ﬁre safety decision-making. These conditions need to be created. Some basic issues, in no particular order of importance, which exist in relation to tunnel ﬁre safety and which we need to be able to cope with are given below; there is no doubt that there are many others. .

Fire risk in tunnels is a result of the working of a system involving design, operation, emergency response and tunnel use. That is, ﬁre risk is a systemic product. Further, this ‘tunnel system’ involves both ‘designed parts’ and ‘non-designed parts’, for example traﬃc volume or individual behaviour of users. The designed parts need to take account of the non-designed parts as much as possible. Tunnels are becoming ever larger and more complex; we need to be able to deal with this. The system changes. A tunnel system which exists at the time of opening will be diﬀerent to the tunnel system which exists a few years later. What are to be regarded as acceptable ranges for ﬁre risks with regard to: (1) fatality/ injury, (2) property loss and (3) disruption of operation? As a corollary: what are to be regarded as acceptable ranges for an upgraded existing tunnel as opposed to a new tunnel? What is to be an acceptable methodology for tunnel ﬁre safety decision-making?

Figure 0.2. Intermediate methodology B .

The part played by models in tunnel ﬁre safety decision-making. Models, especially computer-based models, have the potential to play a very valuable role. However, an acceptable context within which models may be employed in a reliable and acceptable way needs to be created. This implies: (1) independent assessment of models, their limitations and conditions of applicability; (2) acceptable ‘methodologies of use’ for models given cases; (3) knowledgeable users who are familiar both with the

model and ﬁre science. Models should only ever be used in a supportive role, in the context of other ﬁre knowledge and experience. An overarching probabilistic framework needs to be created, within which both probabilistic and deterministic models may play a part. A synthesis of deterministic and probabilistic modelling needs to be brought about. Experimental tests: we need large and full-scale tests as well as small-scale tests. Also, we need replication of experimental tests, because of the variability of experimental results for ostensibly ‘identical’ tests. Operator response: (1) to what extent is automation feasible or desirable? (2) to what extent can decision-making during an emergency be simpliﬁed and yet still be able to cope eﬀectively with diﬀerent emergency situations, in increasingly complex tunnel systems? Tunnel ﬁre dynamics: we know more than we did but we need to know much more. Fire suppression: what kinds of systems are appropriate? How is real human behaviour to be taken account of in tunnel ﬁre emergencies? At present we know very little.

Whatever else follows from considering the above issues, one thing is certain: a sound understanding of tunnel ﬁre science and engineering is needed. Further, this needs to be seen in its widest sense to include, for example, human behaviour and what risk is to be regarded as socially acceptable. While a signiﬁcant amount of tunnel ﬁre research has been carried out in recent years, much remains to be done. Moreover, as systems change then there will be a continual need for ﬁre research to understand the nature of ﬁre risk in tunnels and be able to control it in an acceptable way. Needed research is implied by the issues raised above. More speciﬁcally, to pinpoint a very few, some key research questions which we need answers to are: (a) (b) (c) (d)

What are eﬀective ways of preventing ﬁres occurring in tunnels? What are the factors aﬀecting tunnel ﬁre size and spread? What are the characteristics of diﬀerent tunnel ﬁre suppression systems? How do human beings behave in tunnel ﬁre emergencies – both users and tunnel staﬀ/ﬁre brigade personnel? (e) What are eﬀective evacuation systems? ( f ) To what extent can emergency response be ‘automated’? (g) How do we deal with uncertainty in models which are used as part of ﬁre safety decision-making? Other issues and needed research areas are implied in the chapters of this Handbook and especially in the chapter on ‘Tunnel ﬁre safety and the law’ by Arnold Dix (Chapter 20). Addressing the research required as a result of considering the above issues and key research questions will require willingness by researchers to become engaged in such areas and also funding. International collaboration in research has played an important role in the past and it may be expected to continue to do so. There needs to be a strategy for tunnel ﬁre research, involving both international collaboration and eﬀort by individual countries. Further, there needs to be an openness about research results. It is not acceptable for results to be kept secret. However it is done, these issues and implied research areas need to be addressed for the beneﬁt of all countries and their citizens.

References 1. Anon. The Hard Systems Approach. The Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1984. 2. Checkland, P. Systems Thinking, Systems Practice. Wiley, Chichester, 1981. 3. Charters, D. Fire risk assessment of rail tunnels. Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Basel, 23–25 November 1992; published by University of Dundee and Independent Technical Conferences. 4. Beard, A. N. Towards a rational approach to ﬁre safety. Fire Prevention Science and Technology, 1979, 22, 16–22. 5. Beard, A. N. Towards a systemic approach to ﬁre safety. Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Fire Safety Science, Washington, DC, USA, 7–11 October 1985. 6. Beard, A. N. Risk assessment assumptions. Civil Engineering and Environmental Systems, 2004, 21(1), 19–31.

Tunnel ventilation – state of the art Art Bendelius, Parsons Brinckerhoﬀ, USA

Introduction Webster’s dictionary deﬁnes ventilation simply as ‘circulation of air’. Ventilation does not necessarily mean the use of mechanical devices such as fans being employed; the non-fan or natural ventilation is still considered to be ventilation. From that simple deﬁnition of ventilation we move forward to the ventilation of tunnels. The use of tunnels dates back to early civilisations and so too does ventilation in the form of natural ventilation. However, the ventilation of tunnels has taken on greater signiﬁcance within the past century, due to the invention and application of steam engines and internal combustion engines which are prevalent as motive power in the transport industry. This all became evident as increasing quantities of combustion products and heat would become more troublesome to the travelling public. Exposure to the products of combustion generated by vehicles travelling through a tunnel can cause discomfort and illness to vehicle occupants. Ventilation became the solution by providing a means to dilute the contaminants and to provide a respirable environment for the vehicle occupants. Visibility within the tunnel will also be aided by the dilution eﬀect of the ventilation air. In the past quarter century, great concern has arisen regarding the ﬁre life safety of the vehicle occupants in all transport tunnels. Much eﬀort has been made to improve the ﬁre life safety within tunnels, thus focusing more attention on the emergency ventilation systems installed within tunnels. The use of the term ‘tunnel’ in this chapter refers to all transportation-related tunnels including road tunnels, transit (metro or subway) tunnels and railway tunnels. Road tunnels, from a ventilation viewpoint, are deﬁned as any enclosure through which road vehicles travel. This deﬁnition includes not only those facilities that are built as tunnels, but those that result from other construction such as development of air rights over roads. All road tunnels require ventilation, which can be provided by natural means, traﬃc-induced piston eﬀects and mechanical ventilation equipment. Ventilation is required to limit the concentration of obnoxious or dangerous contaminants to acceptable levels during normal operation and to remove and control smoke and hot gases during ﬁre-based emergencies. The ventilation system selected must meet

Prevention and protection

the speciﬁed criteria for both normal and emergency operations and should be the most economical solution considering both construction and operating costs. The portions of transit (metro) systems located below the surface in underground structures most likely will require control of the environment. In transit (metro) systems, there are two types of tunnel: the standard underground tunnel, which is usually located between stations and normally constructed beneath surface developments with numerous ventilation shafts and exits communicating with the surface; and the long tunnel, usually crossing under a body of water, or through a mountain. The ventilation concepts for these two types will be diﬀerent, since in the long tunnel there is usually limited ability to locate a shaft at any intermediate point, as can be accomplished in the standard underground tunnel. The characteristics for a long transit tunnel will be similar to the ventilation requirements for a railway tunnel. Ventilation is required in many railway tunnels to remove the heat generated by the locomotive units and to change the air within the tunnel, thus ﬂushing the tunnel of pollutants. Ventilation can take the form of natural, piston eﬀect or mechanical ventilation. While the train is in the tunnel, the heat is removed by an adequate ﬂow of air with respect to the train, whereas the air contaminants are best removed when there is a positive airﬂow out of the tunnel portal.

The early ventilation concepts The earliest evidence of serious consideration of ventilation appeared in the transit or metro tunnels where the ventilation of transit (metro) tunnels was accomplished by utilising the piston eﬀect generated by the moving trains and by installing large grating-covered openings in the surface, sometimes called ‘blow-holes’, thus permitting a continuous exchange of air (when trains were running) with the outside and subsequently lowering the tunnel air temperature. However, in the early part of the twentieth century, when the air temperatures in the tunnels began to rise in both London and New York, mechanical means of ventilation (fans) began to be employed. One of the ﬁrst formal ventilation systems in a road tunnel was in the Holland Tunnel (New York) in the 1920s. A signiﬁcant amount of testing was performed in the United States by the US Bureau of Mines1 prior to the design and construction of the Holland Tunnel which opened to traﬃc in 1927. The use of mechanical ventilation in road tunnels coincided with the growing concern for the impact of the exhaust gases from internal combustion engine propelled vehicles in road tunnels.

Types of ventilation system There are two basic types of ventilation airﬂow systems applied in transport tunnels: longitudinal and transverse. Longitudinal. The airﬂow is longitudinal through the tunnel and essentially moves the pollutants and/or heated gases along with the incoming fresh air and provides fresh air at the beginning of the tunnel or tunnel section and discharges heated or polluted air at the tunnel portal or at the end of the tunnel section (see Figure 7.1). Longitudinal ventilation can be conﬁgured either portal to portal, portal to shaft or shaft to shaft as shown in Figure 7.1. The air entering the tunnel is at ambient conditions and is impacted by the pollution contaminants and the heated gases from

Tunnel ventilation – state of the art

Figure 7.1. Longitudinal ventilation conﬁgurations

the vehicles moving through the tunnel, as clearly seen in Figure 7.2. It is longitudinal airﬂow which is applied most often in transit (metro) and railway tunnels. Transverse. Transverse ﬂow is created by the uniform distribution of fresh air and/or uniform collection of vitiated air along the length of the tunnel. This airﬂow format is used mostly in road tunnels although it is occasionally applied for unique circumstances in transit tunnels. The uniform distribution and collection of air throughout the length of a tunnel will provide a consistent level of temperature and pollutants throughout the tunnel. The transverse ventilation system can be conﬁgured as fully transverse or semi-transverse.

Mechanical versus natural ventilation systems An evaluation of the natural ventilation eﬀects in a tunnel must determine whether a suﬃcient amount of the heat and/or pollutants emitted from the vehicles is being

Figure 7.2. Longitudinal ventilation airﬂow characteristics

Index before 1940 ﬁre incidents 36ÿ7 1940ÿ60s ﬁre incidents 34ÿ6 1970s ﬁre incidents 30ÿ4 1980s ﬁre incidents 24ÿ30 1990s ﬁre incidents 17ÿ24 2000 to present incidents 10ÿ17 615b test 278ÿ82 ‘A’ series FIRE-SPRINT models 160ÿ2 acceptable ranges, risk xix access see means of access accidents computer-based program 475 rules 347ÿ9 scenarios 369ÿ74 ACTEURS project 339 active ﬁre protection 87ÿ8, 113, 119ÿ22, 416ÿ17 activity attachment 336 additives, concrete 118 age factors 334ÿ5 agencies 442 air ducts 439 air ﬂow velocities 156, 241ÿ5 alarm systems architecture 98ÿ9 assessment 103ÿ5 emergency procedures 468ÿ9, 475ÿ6 state-of-the-art 103ÿ5 systems architecture 107ÿ8 video-image processing 107ÿ8 alertness 100ÿ5, 336ÿ7 American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) 154ÿ5 ammonia release 368 analyses, see also sampling and analyses annual emergency procedure exercises 479ÿ80 architecture see systems architecture ASET see available safe egress time Ashby’s law 395, 404 ASHRAE see American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-conditioning Engineers assessment, alarm systems 103ÿ5 Australia 219, 226, 427 Austria Kaisermu¨hlen Tunnel 369 Kaprun (Kilzstein) tunnel ﬁre 6ÿ7, 326ÿ7, 328, 331 QRAM experiences 376ÿ7 Tauern Tunnel ﬁre 326, 328 available safe egress time (ASET) 333, 334 avoidance measures 89ÿ91 axial ﬂow fans 135 Azerbaijan 324ÿ5, 328, 498 ‘B’ series FIRE-SPRINT models 162 back-layering (smoke backﬂow) 153 Baku rail/metro ﬁre 324ÿ5, 328, 498 Baregg Tunnel 213ÿ14 basic issues xixÿxxi, 184ÿ6 Bayes’ theorem 187ÿ8

beam detectors 95, 96 behaviour concrete 111ÿ13 road tunnel users 343ÿ53 when driving 347ÿ9 see also human behaviour Benelux Tunnel (2nd) ﬁre tests 209ÿ10, 254 BHRG/BHRA see British Hydrodynamics Research Group bi-directional communication paradigms 406 boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) 357, 358, 371ÿ3 bored tube tunnels 111 bottom line 472, 473 boundary conditions 272ÿ3, 278 breathing apparatus 484ÿ8, 495, 499ÿ500 British Hydrodynamics Research Group (BHRG was BHRA) 137 BRONZE incident level 421 burning process 251, 258ÿ9 burning rate see ﬁre heat release rate Byfjord Tunnel 217 cables 101, 207ÿ8 Caldecott Tunnel 5, 173ÿ4, 324, 328 CALs see current achievement levels car ﬁres 195 carbon monoxide/dioxide ratio techniques 252ÿ4 case studies 189ÿ95, 275ÿ82, 308ÿ13 casualties 295 causation, prevention and protection 83 cause of ﬁre 64ÿ71 CCTV image processing systems 105ÿ8 ceilings 55, 58, 255ÿ6 centrifugal fans 136 CEs see crucial events CFD testing 223ÿ4 CFX software 176 Channel Tunnel 7 Safety Authority 44ÿ6, 48, 49, 51ÿ2 supplementary ventilation system 151, 152 ventilation systems 145, 151, 152, 159ÿ60 Channel Tunnel ﬁre 325, 328, 331 chronology 45 CTSA investigations 44ÿ6, 48, 49 damage 46ÿ7 discussion 50ÿ1 ﬁndings 48ÿ9 ﬁre spread 260, 261 HGV shuttles 43 human behaviour 325, 328, 331 incident 44, 45, 48ÿ9 investigation 42ÿ52 issues 49ÿ50 lessons 49ÿ50 safety experiments 224ÿ5 safety systems 43ÿ4 suppression tests 208 tunnel system 42ÿ3

Charters et al. model 169ÿ70 chlorine release 368 city rail systems see metro systems cladding systems 117ÿ18 closure problems 270 cold BLEVE 357, 358 combustion 63, 172, 239ÿ41, 248ÿ9 commissioning installations 213ÿ15 common tunnel conﬁgurations 149 communication 396ÿ9, 405, 406, 499ÿ500 comparisons, theoretical/experimental results 311ÿ13 compartment ﬁres dynamics 232ÿ7 see also train coaches composite ﬁre protection lining layers 118 computational ﬂuid dynamics (CFD) modelling 138, 267ÿ83 boundary conditions 272ÿ3, 278 case studies 275ÿ82 closure problems 270 design for safety 170ÿ6 ﬁre modelling 273ÿ4, 277ÿ8 ﬁre movement 165ÿ6 geometry conditions 272ÿ3 introduction 267ÿ8 longitudinal grids 276, 277 mathematical overview 268ÿ71 Memorial Tunnel experiments 275ÿ82 notation 282 physical phenomena 271 precautions 274 radiation 274 Rhodes 170ÿ3 smoke control outputs 171 steady-state tests 278 technique application 271ÿ4 transient simulation 278ÿ82 upstream ﬁre temperatures 280ÿ1 validation/veriﬁcation 274ÿ5 computers 137ÿ8, 310, 475 concrete 110ÿ26 conservation equations 285ÿ7 constitutive crucial events 85 contingency planning 441ÿ5, 457ÿ65 control ﬁre gases 497ÿ9 heat/smoke 99 incident development 412 objectives 154 paradigms 399, 405ÿ6 TFSMS model 396ÿ9 within 2 minutes (heat/smoke) 99 see also smoke control; ventilation control . . . control volume modelling 284ÿ98 application 284ÿ9 assumptions 284ÿ5 casualty outcome 295 conservation equations 285ÿ7 critical heat release/separation graph 290ÿ1 FÿN curves 296 ﬁre growth 290ÿ1 ﬁre scenarios 294ÿ5 ﬁre tenability 292ÿ5 heat transfer 287ÿ9 mass ﬂow schematic 286 mass and heat transfer sub-models 287ÿ9 safe outcome 294ÿ5 safety applications 290ÿ6 smoke movement 291ÿ2 source terms 287 typical results 292, 293

cooperative exercises 479 copper tube heat sensors 103 corporate liability 425ÿ7 covered trench tunnels 215ÿ16 criminal responsibility 423ÿ4, 425 critical heat release/separation graph 290ÿ1 critical velocity 153, 164, 223 crucial events (CEs) 82ÿ3 current achievement levels (CALs) 400 current practice 437ÿ80 cut and cover tunnels 111, 113 ‘cut-oﬀ’ height, ﬂames 255 cylinders 371ÿ3 Daish and Linden model 168, 169 damage 59, 62, 63, 344ÿ5, 369 dampers 136 dangerous goods see hazardous goods Decision Support Model (DSM) 359 decision-making xviiÿxxii ﬁre safety 306ÿ8 ﬁrst principles 429ÿ30 incident management 448ÿ9 incident response 417ÿ21 legal investigations 428ÿ33 models xviiiÿxxi deﬁnitions 186ÿ7 Denmark 464, 473ÿ80 Des Monts Tunnel 215 design 89ÿ91, 410, 437ÿ9, 447ÿ52 design for safety ASHRAE 154ÿ5 back-layering 153 computational ﬂuid dynamics 170ÿ6 critical velocity 153 ﬁre characteristics 157ÿ65 ﬁre control objectives 154 guidance 145 modelling 165ÿ76 MTFVTP tests 155ÿ7 positive smoke control 148 smoke control 148, 151ÿ7 ventilation 144ÿ83 detection see ﬁre detection deterministic models 303ÿ4, 305 development controlled incidents 412 emergency response 338 uncontrolled incidents 412 diﬀerences, tunnel design 451ÿ2 digital image processing algorithms 106 direct numerical simulation (DNS) 172 distance between vehicles 352 DNS see direct numerical simulation documentation inadequacy 311 drainage systems 225ÿ6 drivers 347ÿ51, 353 driving standards 411 DSM see Decision Support Model EBA (Eisenbahn Bundesamt) curves 115 ECSs see externally committed systems education 468ÿ73, 478 egress capability proﬁles 323 electrical sparks 70 emergencies 348, 349, 408ÿ21 see also incident response emergency procedures 435ÿ504 acceptance 462 alarm 468ÿ9, 475ÿ6 annual exercises 479ÿ80

bottom line 472, 473 common features 453, 456 computer-based accident program 475 contingency planning 441ÿ5, 457ÿ65 cooperative exercises 479 current practice 437ÿ80 education 468ÿ73, 478 emergency services 476ÿ8 engineering services 439ÿ40 equipment 467ÿ8 evacuation 476 feedback 444ÿ5 ﬁxed installations 439ÿ40, 467 future ideas 437ÿ80 Great Belt Tunnel example 473ÿ80 incident management 446ÿ7 independent exercises 478ÿ9 initial response 468ÿ9 key agencies 442 key factors 467, 469ÿ70 materials 467ÿ8 objectives 465ÿ6 organisation 468 overview 464ÿ5 personnel 468 phases 467, 469ÿ70 planning 441ÿ5, 457ÿ61, 466 precautions 467 rail tunnels 451ÿ80 rapid response teams 446 reconnaissance visits 443ÿ4 response 441, 468ÿ9 response schematics 470, 472 response team location 445ÿ6 road tunnels 437ÿ50 safety management 437ÿ41 self-rescue 468ÿ9, 476 service intervention 469ÿ70 simpliﬁed plans 460ÿ1 standard operational procedures 451ÿ7 testing 444, 461ÿ2 time 471ÿ3 traﬃc management 440ÿ1 training 462ÿ4, 468ÿ73, 478 validation 461ÿ2 where, when and why 456ÿ7 see also incident response emergency services 414ÿ15, 476ÿ8 engineering 424ÿ5, 439ÿ40 enhanced user interface 379 environmental damage 369 equipment emergency procedures 467ÿ8 provision 445 standards 410 surveillance 490ÿ1 error sources, theoretical models 308ÿ9 EUREKA Firetun projects 157, 158, 176, 204ÿ6, 256ÿ7 European Union (EU) 354ÿ5, 381ÿ2 Eurotunnel see Channel Tunnel evacuation 491ÿ3 egress capability proﬁles 323 emergency procedures 476 modelling 315 safety tunnels 346 space 482 evaluation units 103 event trees 85, 86, 90, 371 evidence 427ÿ8 exhaust semi-transverse ventilation systems 133ÿ4 exits 348, 349

experimental testing 201ÿ30 basic issues xxi Japan 147 non-tunnel 224ÿ6 safety places 219ÿ20 small scale 218ÿ21 sprinkler evaluation 212ÿ13 theoretical results comparisons 311ÿ13 water suppression systems 121ÿ2 explosions 54, 55, 71, 225ÿ6, 357 see also boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion externally committed systems (ECSs) 397, 398 extinguishing ﬁres 486ÿ7, 501ÿ2 FÿN curves 296, 368 fail-safe systems 97ÿ8 false alarm safe systems 97ÿ8 false inferences 305ÿ6 fans 135ÿ6, 150ÿ1 FASIT (Fire growth And Smoke movement In Tunnels) model 169ÿ70 FCEs see fundamental crucial events FDS V2.0 model 175ÿ6 feedback 405, 444ÿ5 FFF Tunnel 216 ﬁbre-optic cables 102 ﬁbre-reinforced composites 118 ﬁbreglass conductors 102ÿ3 ﬁdelity lack 309ÿ10 Finland 121ÿ2 ﬁre characteristics 157ÿ65, 184ÿ98 ﬁre detection 93ÿ109 beam smoke detectors 95, 96 detector types 95 future trends 105ÿ8 heat 96ÿ7 line-type heat detectors 101ÿ3 operational performance requirements 99ÿ100 principles 94, 97ÿ8 problems 93ÿ8 smoke 94ÿ5, 96 see also heat detectors; smoke detectors ﬁre dynamics 199ÿ320 compartment ﬁres 232ÿ7 ﬁre development 93ÿ4, 233ÿ5 ﬁre spread 259ÿ62 ﬂame length 254ÿ8 ﬂashover 235ÿ7 fuel control 238ÿ9 HRR determination 252ÿ4 longitudinal ﬂow 245ÿ52 nomenclature 262ÿ3 open ﬁres 231ÿ2 smoke stratiﬁcation 241ÿ5 ventilation control 238ÿ9 ﬁre experiments 201ÿ15 ﬁre gases 493ÿ4, 497ÿ9 ﬁre growth 189ÿ91, 290ÿ1 ﬁre loads 345 ﬁre modelling 273ÿ4, 277ÿ8, 299ÿ300, 316 see also computational ﬂuid dynamics modelling ﬁre movement 165ÿ76 ﬁre progression 62ÿ3 ﬁre propagation 71ÿ2 ﬁre protection alternative suppression systems 122ÿ3 composite layers 118 concepts 87ÿ8 concrete tunnels 110ÿ26 ﬁbre-reinforced composites 118 Finland 121ÿ2

ﬁre protection (continued) inadequate 111 Netherlands 114 structural integrity 110ÿ26 see also active ﬁre protection; passive ﬁre protection ﬁre risk indices 401 ﬁre safety acceptable methodologies 313ÿ14 application mistakes 311 case study 308ÿ13 Channel Tunnel 224ÿ5 decision making 306ÿ8 deterministic models 303ÿ4, 305 documentation inadequacy 311 evacuation modelling 315 experiments 224ÿ5 false inferences 305ÿ6 ﬁre model term 299ÿ300 ﬁre scenario selection 332 knowledgeable users 314ÿ15 management 86ÿ7, 321ÿ434 see also Tunnel Fire Safety Management System model methodology of use 313ÿ14 models 299ÿ319 performance 399ÿ403 planning 401 probabilistic models 303, 304ÿ5 qualitative results 315 quantitative results 315 risk levels 400 software mistakes 310 speciﬁc model potential 313 statistics problems 305ÿ6 systemic approach 388ÿ407 theoretical models 302ÿ6, 308ÿ9, 311ÿ13 validation 307ÿ8 value potential 306ÿ7 ﬁre scenarios 294ÿ5, 332 ﬁre science 184ÿ6 ﬁre sequence 91 Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels report 119ÿ21 ﬁre sources 186ÿ7 ﬁre spread 72ÿ3, 159ÿ62, 259ÿ62 ﬁre suppression tests 208, 209, 212ÿ13 ﬁre tenability 292ÿ5 ﬁre types 187 ﬁre-ﬁghters 485, 488, 494ÿ5 FIRE-SPRINT (ﬁre spread in tunnels) models 160ÿ2, 260ÿ1 FirePASS system (Fire Prevention And Suppression System) 122ÿ3 Firetun projects see EUREKA . . . ﬁxed installations 439ÿ40, 467 ﬂames 95ÿ6, 185, 254ÿ8 ﬂaming ﬁre tests 106ÿ7 ﬂashover 157ÿ62, 235ÿ7 ﬂow rate/time graphs 279 FLOW3D simulations 174ÿ5 Fluid Dynamics Simulator (FDS) software 172 foam–water sprinkler systems 121 forced air velocity group 242ÿ3 forced ventilation 185, 190ÿ5 France corporate liability 425ÿ6 Grand Mare Tunnel 216ÿ17 INERIS 206, 219ÿ20 OECD/PIARC QRAM use 377ÿ81 regulation framework 377ÿ81 see also Channel Tunnel; Mont Blanc tunnel Frejus Tunnel 216

Froude scaling 164, 218, 222 fuel-controlled ﬁres 185, 234, 237ÿ41 fuel-lean ﬁres 185, 234, 237ÿ41 fuel-rich ﬁres see ventilation-controlled ﬁres fuel oil 69ÿ70 fuels combustion products 248ÿ9 ﬁre causes 64ÿ5 ignition 65ÿ6 mass optical density 251 nature of 64ÿ5 origins 68ÿ9 fundamental crucial events (FCEs) 84ÿ6 future emergency procedures 437ÿ80 ﬁre detection 105ÿ8 multimodal platform models 383ÿ5 rail tunnels 451ÿ80 ventilation 140 gas concentrations 248ÿ50 escapes 421 ﬂow 218ÿ19 temperature 245ÿ8 geographical information system (GIS) 378ÿ81 Germany 114, 115, 426 GIS (geographical information system) 378ÿ81 Glasgow Tunnel ﬁre experiments 202ÿ3 GOLD incident level 421, 446 Grand Mare Tunnel, Rouen 216ÿ17 Great Belt Tunnel, Denmark 464, 473ÿ80 groupings dangerous goods 355ÿ66 principles 356ÿ7 proposed system 357ÿ66 QRAM 366 system description 358ÿ9 guidelines, ventilation 138ÿ9, 140 Hammerfest Tunnel 205ÿ6 handbooks, ventilation 138ÿ9 hazard development 333 hazardous goods transport 354ÿ87 European Union 354ÿ5, 381ÿ2 rail transport 381ÿ6 road tunnels 354ÿ81 see also dangerous goods hazardous spillages 420 hazards, risk comparison 81ÿ2 Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL) 174ÿ5 heat control within 2 minutes 99 detectors 96ÿ7, 102ÿ3 development 93ÿ4 movement 207 rated cables 101 see also temperature heat fractional eﬀective dose see ﬁre tenability heat release rate (HRR) compartment ﬁres 232 determination 252ÿ4 ﬁres 164, 185ÿ98, 345 non-dimensional ﬂame lengths 257ÿ8 ventilation inﬂuence 254 heat release variation 158ÿ9 heat release/time graphs 278ÿ9 heat transfer 185, 186, 287ÿ9 HGVs (heavy goods vehicles) 3, 6 EUREKA 499 ﬁre tests 256ÿ7 ﬁre event trees, QRAM 371

ﬁre growth 189ÿ91, 196 power supplies 70 shuttles 43 trailers 62, 63 high air velocity group 242ÿ3 history 3ÿ41 before 1940 ﬁre incidents 36ÿ7 1940–60s ﬁre incidents 34ÿ6 1970s ﬁre incidents 30ÿ4 1980s ﬁre incidents 24ÿ30 1990s ﬁre incidents 17ÿ24 2000 to present 10ÿ17 experimental tunnel ﬁres 201ÿ30 incidents list 9ÿ37 HRR see heat release rate HSE tunnel, UK 220, 223 human behaviour age factors 334ÿ5 alertness 336ÿ7 available safe egress time 333, 334 Baku rail/metro ﬁre 324ÿ5, 328 Caldecott Tunnel 324, 328 Channel Tunnel ﬁre 325, 328, 331 commitment 336 familiarity 335 ﬁres 332ÿ4 gender 334 hazard development 333 major tunnel ﬁres 327ÿ9 Mont Blanc tunnel ﬁre 325, 328 object/activity attachment 336 occupant characteristics 334, 336 panic concept 337ÿ8 physical/sensory capabilities 335 pre-evacuation activity times 333 recent developments 338ÿ9 required safe egress time 333 responsibility/role 336 social aﬃliation 336 Tauern Tunnel ﬁre 326, 328 tunnel ﬁres 323ÿ42 understanding 329ÿ38 human factors 321ÿ434 Hwang et al. model 168, 169 hybrid models 168 ICSs see internally committed systems ignition 69ÿ72, 82ÿ3 image processing systems 105ÿ8 immersed tube tunnels 111, 113 incident response 408ÿ21 actions 417ÿ21 concepts 416ÿ17 decisions 417ÿ21 passive stage 416 stages 416ÿ17 standards 411 see also emergency procedures incidents Channel Tunnel ﬁndings 48ÿ9 chronology 45, 60, 61 legal investigations 422ÿ8 list 9ÿ37 management 446ÿ9 nature of 412ÿ14 see also history indicators, QRAM 368 individual risk, QRAM 369 INERIS, France 206, 219ÿ20, 383ÿ5 information campaigns 349ÿ50

lack 489ÿ90 systems 353 initial response procedures 468ÿ9 injection-type longitudinal ventilation systems 131 injuries 420 installation commissioning 213ÿ15 integration, systems 447ÿ9 intermediate methodologies xviiiÿxix internally committed systems (ICSs) 397, 398ÿ9 international incidents 8ÿ9 investigations 42ÿ76 Channel Tunnel ﬁre 42ÿ52 issues to beware of 432ÿ3 Mont Blanc Tunnel ﬁre 208ÿ9 St Gotthard Tunnel ﬁre 53ÿ76 see also legal investigations Italy 4, 325, 328, 426 Japan experiments 147 ﬁre suppression systems testing 212ÿ13 Nihonzaka Tunnel 5 PWRI Tunnel ﬁre experiments 204 small scale ﬁre experiments 219 Toumei-Meishin expressway tunnel 210 JASMINE (smoke movement in enclosures) code 173ÿ4 jet fans 131ÿ2, 150, 276, 277 Kaisermu¨hlen Tunnel, Vienna 369 Kaprun (Kilzstein) tunnel ﬁre, Austria 6, 326ÿ7, 328, 331, 493, 494 King’s Cross ﬁre, UK 491 knowledge xviiÿxxii knowledgeable users 314ÿ15 laboratories 76, 221ÿ4 large eddy simulations (LES) 172, 176 large pool ﬁres 194, 196 law, safety 422ÿ34 layered structure, TFSMS model 392 legal investigations decisions 428ÿ33 economic considerations 430 evidence 427ÿ8 incidents 422ÿ8 issues to beware of 432ÿ3 past decisions 428ÿ33 risk analysis 430ÿ1 legal powers, incidents 423 LES see large eddy simulations Linden model see Daish and Linden model line-type heat ﬁre detectors 101ÿ5 lining systems 115ÿ18 locations, response teams 445ÿ6 long-term objective index (LTOI) 402 longitudinal ﬂow average ﬂow conditions 245ÿ52 carbon monoxide/dioxide ratio techniques 252ÿ4 gas concentrations 248ÿ50 gas temperature 245ÿ8 velocity 245ÿ8 visibility 250ÿ2 longitudinal grids 276, 277 longitudinal ventilation systems 128ÿ9 design for safety 148 ﬂame length 256ÿ8 large ﬁres 258ÿ9 mechanical 131ÿ2 Memorial Tunnel Program 207 Mont Blanc road tunnel 156

longitudinal ventilation systems (continued) natural 188ÿ97 plumes 288 typical arrangements 150 zones 258ÿ9 lost time injuries (LTI) 398 low air velocity group 241ÿ2 LTOI see long-term objective index Madrid Metro tests 209 MAGs see model assessment groups maintenance standards 410ÿ11 major extra investment level (MAJEIL) 400ÿ1 major incidents avoidance measures 90ÿ1 deﬁnition 446 human behaviour 327ÿ9 levels 421 responses 419ÿ20 ventilation inﬂuence 159ÿ62 see also incident response management and design integration 447ÿ9 human factors 321ÿ434 see also traﬃc management map, Austria 376 MRA see maximum risk acceptable mass ﬂow 286 mass and heat transfer sub-models 287ÿ9 mass optical density 251 maximum risk acceptable (MRA) 403 means of access/escape 439, 496ÿ7 measurement systems 399 mechanical ventilation systems 131ÿ4, 147ÿ51 medium pool ﬁres 192ÿ4 Memorial Tunnel experiments 615b test 278ÿ82 boundary conditions 278 case studies 275ÿ82 CFD modelling 275ÿ82 ﬁre modelling 277ÿ8 ﬂow rate/time graphs 279 heat release/time graphs 278ÿ9 modelling approach 276ÿ7 physical situation 276 steady-state model tests 278 transient simulation 278ÿ82 upstream ﬁre temperatures 280ÿ1 volumetric ﬂow 278 Memorial Tunnel Fire Ventilation Test Program (MTFVTP) 121, 206ÿ7 design for safety tests 155ÿ7 ﬁre fanning tests 150ÿ1 mechanical ventilation systems 132, 134 methodologies xviiiÿxx, 313ÿ14, 367 metro systems 455ÿ6 MFIRE models 166 minor extra investment level (MINEIL) 400ÿ1 mistakes, software 310 model assessment groups (MAGs) 307 models 165ÿ76 decision-making xixÿxxi phenomenological 167ÿ70 potential 313 reality 309ÿ10 results variability 305 see also CFD modelling; quantitative risk assessment models; theoretical models; Tunnel Fire Safety Management System model; turbulence models moderate air velocity group 242

Monaco Branch Tunnel 216 monitoring equipment 490ÿ1 Mont Blanc road tunnel 4, 148ÿ50, 156ÿ7, 343 human behaviour 325, 328 investigations 208ÿ9 refurbishment 116 Mornay Tunnel 7 motors 136 MTFVTP see Memorial Tunnel Fire Ventilation Test Program multimodal platform model future 383ÿ5 National Fire Protection Association 121, 157 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 172 NATM see New Austrian Tunnel Method natural ventilation 130ÿ1 ﬂame heat transfer to burning object 185 heat release rate 188ÿ97 longitudinal 188ÿ97 operating modes during ﬁre 146ÿ7 plumes 288 tunnel ﬁres 188ÿ97 Netherlands 114, 159, 209ÿ10, 254, 426 network ventilation modelling 166ÿ7 New Austrian Tunnel Method (NATM) 111 new technologies 105ÿ8 New Zealand 207ÿ8 Nihonzaka Tunnel, Japan 5 NIST see National Institute of Standards and Technology Nogent-Sur-Marne covered trench 215ÿ16 non-dimensional numbers 164, 218ÿ19, 222, 257ÿ8 non-tunnel ﬁre experiments 224ÿ6 Norway 211ÿ12, 312, 426 notation, CFD modelling 282 numerical solution procedures 309ÿ10 objectives 345ÿ7, 465ÿ6 occupants 330, 334, 336 OECD see Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Ofenegg Tunnel 201ÿ2 OFROU Task Force 226 older tunnels 144ÿ5 one tunnel systems 453ÿ4, 502ÿ3 open ﬁre dynamics 231ÿ2 operational procedures see emergency procedures operational safety factors 410ÿ12 operations systems 146ÿ57, 408ÿ21 opinion evidence 428 organic ﬁre protection coatings 119 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 344, 351, 377ÿ81 organisational principles 404ÿ5 over-ventilated ﬁres see fuel-controlled ﬁres overtaking, driving 352 overview diﬃculties 489ÿ90 oxygen consumption 252 oxygen-rich ﬁres 185, 234, 237ÿ41 oxygen-starved ﬁres see ventilation-controlled ﬁres panelling systems 117ÿ18 panic concept 337ÿ8 Paris Metro experiments 222 passive ﬁre protection 87ÿ8, 113ÿ19 passive stages 416 past decisions, legal investigations 428ÿ33 PEATS see pre-evacuation activity times people mobility 323 performance, ﬁre safety 399ÿ403

personnel, emergency procedures 468 phases, emergency procedures 467, 469ÿ70 phenomenological models 167ÿ70 photographic evidence 66 physical capabilities, humans 335 physical phenomena, CFD modelling 271 PIARC (World Road Association) 119ÿ21, 139, 351 ﬁre control objectives 154 publications 154 recommendations 119ÿ21, 150 smoke control objectives 154 piston relief ducts (PRDs) 151 planning avoidance measures 89ÿ91 emergency procedures 441ÿ5, 457ÿ60, 466 ﬁre safety 401 questions 458ÿ60 simpliﬁed plans 460ÿ1 traﬃc management 418 see also contingency planning plumes 243, 288 policy implementation 390 polystyrene packaging risk example 80 pool ﬁre tests 206, 219 positive smoke control 148 post-ﬂashover stage 233, 235, 236 power supplies, HGVs 70 PRDs see piston relief ducts pre-evacuation activity times (PEATS) 333 pre-ﬂashover stage 233 prefabricated structural lining elements 118 prescriptive codes 89 prevention and protection 77ÿ198 avoidance measures 89ÿ91 causation 83 concepts 82ÿ3, 87 constitutive crucial events 85 context 83 crucial events 82ÿ3 event trees 85, 86 ﬁre safety management 86ÿ7 ﬁre sequence 91 fundamental crucial events 84ÿ6 general concepts 79ÿ92 summary 88ÿ9 tunnel ﬁres 83ÿ6 principles see ﬁrst principles probabilistic models 303, 304ÿ5 problems ﬁre safety models 299ÿ319 rescue operations 489ÿ503 professionals 353, 423ÿ5, 429ÿ30 Promatect lining systems 117 propane burning example 238 protection see prevention and protection publications, ventilation 139 PWRI Tunnel ﬁre experiments 204 qualitative results 315 quantitative results 315 quantitative risk assessment (QRA) 431 quantitative risk assessment (QRA) rail model 383ÿ5 quantitative risk assessment (QRA) road model (QRAM) 355ÿ81 accident scenarios 369ÿ70 Austrian experience 376ÿ7 BLEVEs 371ÿ3 characteristics 366ÿ74 Decision Support Model consistency 359 enhanced user interface 379 French experience 377ÿ81

GIS interface 378ÿ81 groupings, representative goods 366 HGV ﬁre event trees 371 indicators 368 individual risk 369 methodology 367 new structure 378 problem description 367 purpose 367 representative goods, groupings 366 societal risk 368 quantitative risk comparisons 385 questions rescue operations 483, 484 which need answers xxi R&D, safety 393 RABT (Richtlinien fu¨r die Ausstattung und den Betrieb von Straßentunneln) curves 115 radiation models 172ÿ3, 274 radio messages 347ÿ8 rail carriage tests 226 rail transport 381ÿ6 rail tunnels 6ÿ7, 90, 451ÿ80 rapid response teams 446 real tunnel ﬁres 1ÿ76 reality, models 300ÿ3, 309 reconnaissance visits 443ÿ4 recursive structure, TFSMS model 392, 394 reduced-scale ﬁre tests 220 refractory materials 116 refurbishment, Mont Blanc Tunnel 116 regulations dangerous goods transport 351 French framework 377ÿ81 objectives 355ÿ6 rail transport 382ÿ3 Swedish breathing apparatus 495 relative autonomy 394 relative long/medium-term objectives index 402 representative goods 366 required safe egress time (RSET) 333 rescue operations 481ÿ504 exercise site 485ÿ6 extinguishing extensive ﬁres 486ÿ7 ﬁre gases 493ÿ4 information lack 489ÿ90 large numbers of people 491ÿ3 problems/solutions 489ÿ503 in progress 482ÿ4 questions 483, 484 reference assumptions 481ÿ2 situation at start 502 training 493 ventilation assistance 502ÿ3 response developing emergencies 338 team location 445ÿ6 two tunnel tubes 477ÿ8 Rhodes, N. 170ÿ3 Rijkwaterstaat (RWS) curves 144 risk acceptable ranges xix approach methodologies xviiiÿxx FÿN curves 296 ﬁre ﬁghters 494ÿ5 ﬁre spread between vehicles 259ÿ62 hazards comparison 81ÿ2 indices 401 informed methods 89ÿ90 legal investigations 430ÿ1

risk (continued) levels, ﬁre safety 400 main risks 357ÿ8 maximum risk acceptable 403 polystyrene packaging example 80 reduction measures 375ÿ6 road traﬃc 344ÿ5 as systemic product 79ÿ81 waste paper example 80 see also quantitative risk assessment road model road traﬃc 344ÿ5 road transport operators 353 road tunnels 4ÿ6 1999 report 119ÿ21 deﬁnition 127 emergency procedures 437ÿ50 hazardous goods transport 354ÿ81 investigation factors 75ÿ6 operation 408ÿ21 risk reduction measures 374ÿ6 safety objectives 345ÿ7 user recommended behaviour 343ÿ53 road users 349ÿ53 road/rail intermodality 381ÿ6 vehicles 476ÿ7 roadside checks 350 Rouen, France 216ÿ17 RSET see required safe egress time Runehamar Tunnel, Norway 211ÿ12, 312 running tunnels 151 RWS (Rijkwaterstaat) curves 114, 144 S-curves 161 Saccardo nozzle systems 131 safe outcome, scenarios 294ÿ5 SAFESA (safety-critical structural analysis) methodology 313 safety audit 393 chain links 110 common features 453 control volume modelling 290ÿ6 coordination 390ÿ2 development 393 factors 346ÿ8, 410ÿ12 introduction xviiÿxxii law 422ÿ34 management 437ÿ41 objectives 345ÿ7 places 219ÿ20 policy 393ÿ4 proactive commitment 396ÿ9 R&D 393 road traﬃc 344ÿ6 stakeholders 409 systems 43ÿ4 tests 209ÿ10, 224ÿ5 Trans-European Road Network 355 safety critical structural analysis (SAFESA) methodology 313 safety management systems (SMS) 388ÿ407 see also Tunnel Fire Safety Management System model safety tunnel evacuation 346 sampling and analyses, St Gotthard Tunnel ﬁre 66ÿ7 secondary tunnel lining systems 115ÿ16 self-help 350, 468ÿ9, 476 semi-transverse ventilation systems 132ÿ4, 148ÿ50, 156 semiconductor temperature sensors 102

sensitive studies, knowledgeable users 314 sensory capabilities, human behaviour 335 service intervention 469ÿ70 service tunnels 151, 454ÿ5 SES models 166, 167 setting, tunnels 330ÿ2 short circuits 70 short-term objective index 402 shotcrete 111 shuttles 43 SILVER incident level 421 simpliﬁed plans, emergency procedures 460ÿ1 single-bore tunnels see one tunnel . . . site overview diﬃculties 489ÿ90 situation, rescue operation start 502 Smagorinsky model 176 small pool ﬁres 191ÿ2, 193 small scale experimental testing 218ÿ21 Japan 219 small scale models, CFD testing 223ÿ4 smoke beam detectors 95, 96 damage 55, 56 detection 94ÿ5, 96 development 93ÿ4 ﬁre observations 94 movement 165ÿ76, 207, 291ÿ2 stacks 247ÿ8 stratiﬁcation 147, 241ÿ5 temperature stratiﬁed regions 244 tests 106ÿ7 smoke control computational ﬂuid dynamics 171 design objectives 151ÿ7 Froude number-scaled rig 164 PIARC objectives 154 by ventilation 163ÿ5 within 2 minutes 99 social aﬃliation 336 societal risk 368 see also FÿN curves software mistakes, ﬁre safety 310 space for evacuation 482 spalling process 112 span of control 448 speed limits 352 sphinx example 300ÿ2 spillages, hazardous 420 sprinklers 119ÿ21, 212ÿ13 stack heights 247ÿ8 stakeholders, safety 409 standard operational procedures 451ÿ7 standards driving 411 equipment 410 incident response 411 maintenance 410ÿ11 Netherlands 114 operational safety 410ÿ12 professionals 423, 429ÿ30 vehicles 411 ventilation 138ÿ9 STAR-CD code 176 state-of-the-art alarm systems 103ÿ5 deﬁnition 103ÿ4 performance 104 ventilation 127ÿ43 stations 455, 491 statistics problems 305ÿ6 steady-state model tests 278

St Gotthard Tunnel ﬁre (Switzerland) 53ÿ76, 327, 343 burning liquid 64 cause 64ÿ71 combustion traces 63 cross-section 57 discussion 60, 67ÿ8, 69, 74 explosion 54, 55, 71 ﬁre ﬁghting operations 58 ﬁre origin 60ÿ4 ﬁre progression 62ÿ3 ﬁre propagation 71ÿ3 fuel ignition 65ÿ6 fuel origins 68ÿ9 HGVs burning 64 ignition source 69ÿ71 incident chronology 60, 61 incident summary 53ÿ4 incident zone 55ÿ9 investigations 53ÿ76 origins 62 photographic evidence 66 sampling and analyses 66ÿ7 smoke damage 55, 56 smoke release 65 summary description 55ÿ9 thermal degradation 73ÿ4 topographic chart 55, 56 trailer ignition 72 tunnel ceiling 55, 58 tunnel lining 55, 57 vehicle damage 59, 62, 63 vehicle involvement 55, 56, 60ÿ2 ventilation 55, 57 witness statements 64, 65ÿ6 stoichiometric mixtures 237ÿ41 stratiﬁed smoke 147 air velocity ranges 241ÿ5 compartment ﬁres 233 example 243ÿ5 temperature regions 244 structural damage 369 structural integrity 110ÿ26 structural lining elements 118 structural organisation 390ÿ6 sub-models 287ÿ9 Subway Environmental Design Handbook 154 Summit Tunnel ﬁre 152 supplementary ventilation system (SVS) 151, 152 supply air semi-transverse ventilation systems 133 surveillance equipment 490ÿ1 SVS see supplementary ventilation system Sweden 220ÿ1, 481ÿ504 Switzerland 53ÿ76, 213ÿ14, 226, 343 Sydney Harbour Tunnel 134 systemic approaches 388ÿ407 systemic products 79ÿ81 systems architecture 98ÿ9, 107ÿ8 performance 98ÿ100 Task Group 157 Tauern Tunnel ﬁre 326, 328 Ted Williams Tunnel ﬁre 327 temperature ﬁre spread 259ÿ60 sensors 102 upstream 280ÿ1 see also heat terrorism 421 test programs, MTFVTP 121

testing costs 218 emergency procedures 461ÿ2 operational tunnels 215ÿ18 ventilation 139ÿ40 theoretical models error sources 308ÿ9 experimental results comparisons 311ÿ13 ﬁre safety 302ÿ6 results interpretation 314ÿ15 types 303ÿ6 thermal degradation 73ÿ4 time, emergency procedures 471ÿ3 time sequences 45 topographic charts 55, 56 Toumei-Meishin expressway tunnel 210 toxic gas releases 357ÿ8 traﬃc congestion 347ÿ9 traﬃc management 418, 440ÿ1 traﬃc regulations 347 trailers 62, 63, 72 train coaches 236ÿ7 see also compartment ﬁres training 493 emergency procedures 462ÿ4, 468ÿ73, 478 Trans-European Road Network 355 transient simulation 278ÿ82 transverse ventilation systems 129, 132, 133 design for safety 148 mechanical 132ÿ4 Memorial Tunnel Program 207 PIARC recommendations 150 Tunnel Engineering Handbook 145 tunnel ﬁre dynamics 199ÿ320 Tunnel Fire Safety Management System (TFSMS) model 388ÿ407 autonomy 394 characteristics 390 communication 396ÿ9 concepts 389ÿ99 control 396ÿ9 environment 394ÿ6 externally committed systems 397, 398 functions 390ÿ4 information channels 404 internally committed systems 397, 398ÿ9 key systems 390ÿ4 layered structure 392 organisational principles 404ÿ5 policy implementation 390 proactive safety commitment 396ÿ9 recursive structure 392, 394 relative autonomy 394 safety audit 393 coordination 390ÿ2 development 393 functional 392ÿ3 policy 393ÿ4 schematic 391 structural organisation 390ÿ6 tunnel linings 55, 57 tunnel operators 408ÿ21 tunnel systems 453ÿ4 tunnel types 111 tunnelling decisions 429ÿ30 turbulence models 172, 176 two tunnel systems 454ÿ5, 477ÿ8 two-shaft longitudinal ventilation systems 132 tyres, ignition 71ÿ2

UK see United Kingdom unburned fuel ahead of ﬂames on burning object, heat transfer to 186 uncontrolled incidents, development 412 under-ventilated ﬁres see ventilation controlled ﬁres underground city rail systems see metro systems UNECE regulations, rail transport 382ÿ3 United Kingdom (UK) corporate liability 427 HSE tunnel 220, 223 King’s Cross ﬁre 491 West Meon Tunnel 202 see also Channel Tunnel . . . United States of America (USA) ASHRAE 154ÿ5 Bureau of Mines 166 Caldecott Tunnel 5, 173ÿ4, 324, 328 corporate liability 426ÿ7 Ted Williams Tunnel 327 upstream ﬁre temperatures 280ÿ1 UPTUN objectives 214ÿ15 USA see United States of America validation CFD modelling 274ÿ5 emergency procedures 461ÿ2 ﬁre safety 307ÿ8 value potential 306ÿ7 results 196 vehicles breakdown rules 347ÿ9 damage 59, 62, 63 ﬁres, crucial events 83 involvement 55, 56, 60ÿ2 laboratory examination 76 mass optical density 251 road–rail type 476ÿ7 standards 411 thermal degradation 73ÿ4 velocity, longitudinal ﬂow 245ÿ8 VENDIS-FS models 166, 167 ventilation analysis 137ÿ8 applying forced 497ÿ8 Bayes’ theorem 187ÿ8 car ﬁres 195 Channel Tunnel 145, 151, 152 common tunnel conﬁgurations 149 computational ﬂuid dynamics 138 control 162ÿ3 deﬁnition 127 design for safety 144ÿ83 discussion 195ÿ6 early concepts 128 experiments 159 facilities 137 fans 135ÿ6 ﬁre behaviour 157ÿ65, 184ÿ98 case results 189ÿ95 methodologies 187ÿ8 ﬁre spread 159ÿ62 future 140 guidelines 138ÿ9, 140 handbooks 138ÿ9 HGV ﬁres 189ÿ91, 196 HRRs 158ÿ9, 254

large pool ﬁres 194, 196 longitudinal systems 128ÿ9 mechanical 131ÿ4 medium pool ﬁres 192ÿ4 modelling 166ÿ7 Mont Blanc road tunnel 157 motors 136 national guidelines 140 natural 130ÿ1 older tunnels 144ÿ5 operation during ﬁres 146ÿ57 phenomenological models 167ÿ70 PIARC publications 139 pool ﬁres 191ÿ4, 196, 222ÿ3 rescue operation assistance 502ÿ3 small pool ﬁres 191ÿ2, 193 smoke control 163ÿ5 smoke stratiﬁcation 147 standards 138ÿ9 state-of-the-art 127ÿ43 St Gotthard Tunnel ﬁre 55, 57 Sydney Harbour Tunnel 134 systems components 134ÿ7 control 136ÿ7 dampers 136 means of access/escape 439 types 128ÿ34 technology 137ÿ40 testing 139ÿ40 transverse systems 129 velocity 158ÿ9 ventilation controlled ﬁres 162ÿ3, 234 burning process 258ÿ9 fuel-controlled diﬀerences 237ÿ41 veriﬁcation, CFD modelling 274ÿ5 video imaging 107ÿ8 see also CCTV viscosity models 176 visibility examples 251ÿ2 longitudinal ﬂow 250ÿ2 tunnels 127 volumetric ﬂow 278 VTT Tunnel 204 waste paper example 80 water–foam deluge systems 120 water delivery 500ÿ1 extinguishing systems 487 mist systems 119, 121 suppression systems 119ÿ22 WEIL (without extra investment level) 400, 401 well-ventilated ﬁres see fuel-controlled ﬁres West Meon Tunnel ﬁre experiments, UK 202 where, when and why, emergency procedures 456ÿ7 wind tunnels 222ÿ3 without extra investment level (WEIL) 400, 401 witness statements 64, 65ÿ6 world locations 8ÿ9 World Road Association (PIARC) 119ÿ21, 139 yields, combustion products 248ÿ9 zones 168, 258ÿ9 Zwenberg Tunnel 203